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PRISON RESEARCH: A BIOETHICS OR AN ETHICS ISSUE?
Manuel Fanega1
Abstract: The hypothesis of reducing aggressiveness through transcranial direct current stimulation was recently tested on a 
cohort of inmates in Spain. The experiment, including 1.5 mA electric shocks, was an external research initiative that received 
the initial acquiescence of the carceral system. An alarm was raised at the time the research was published, encouraging the 
directorate of prisons to stop the ongoing replication of the experiment. Nevertheless, no (bio)ethics committee, in the uni-
versities or among bioethics experts, has questioned the research. In this think piece, we aim to again discuss some ethical 
approaches to these clinical interventions on crime. After its positivistic period, the field of criminology has been question-
ing the simple psychobiological approach to crime because of the reductionistic view of this phenomenon and its harmful 
consequences. Thus, we address academic experimentation under prison governance and the “re” roles of prisons. We argue 
that the minor disadvantages of such research, if performed with consent, could be positive if the research can minimize the 
harmfulness of prison itself; thus, penitentiary treatment and science should go together. Prison administrations, in addition 
to their duty to protect the individuals under their control from ethically biased research, must promote reintegration. We 
conclude that human rights are over criminal policy and science and that ethics are over narrower bioethics.
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Investigación en prisión: ¿una cuestión de bioética o de ética?
Resumen: La hipótesis de la reducción de la agresividad por medio de estimulaciones transcraneales ha sido recientemente 
testada sobre encarcelados en España. El experimento, que incluyó descargas eléctricas de 1.5mA, fue una iniciativa de 
investigadores externos que encontró la aquiescencia inicial del sistema carcelario. La alarma surgió en el momento en que 
se publicó la investigación, alentando a la dirección de las prisiones a detener la replicación del experimento. Sin embargo, 
hasta entonces, ningún comité encontró ningún inconveniente, ni en las universidades ni entre expertos en bioética. En este 
artículo de reflexión pretendemos argumentar algunos enfoques éticos de estas intervenciones clínicas sobre la delincuencia. 
De nuevo, ya que la criminología, después de su periodo positivista, ha venido cuestionado el mero enfoque psicobiológico 
de la delincuencia. Así, abordamos el experimento académico dentro de la gobernanza penitenciaria y los roles “re” de las 
prisiones. Argumentamos que no es tanto que no se pueda investigar con internos, sino que posibles inconvenientes de 
tales investigaciones puedan servir, bajo consentimiento, para minimizar los inconvenientes de la misma pena de prisión. 
La administración, además del deber de proteger a sus individuos de investigaciones éticamente sesgadas ha de fomentar la 
reintegración. Concluimos que los derechos humanos han de estar por encima de la política criminal y de la ciencia, y la ética 
por encima de una más limitada bioética.
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Investigação em contexto prisional: Um questão de bioética ou de ética?
Resumo: A hipótese de diminuir a agressividade através da estimulação elétrica transcraniana foi recentemente testada num 
grupo de reclusos em Espanha. A experiência, que incluiu choques elétricos de 1,5mA, partiu de uma iniciativa de investigadores 
externos que encontraram a aquiescência no sistema prisional. O alarme surgiu no momento em que a investigação foi publicada, 
o que levou a direção administrativa das prisões a interromper a replicação do estudo. No entanto, até ao momento, nenhuma 
comissão de (bio)ética encontrou qualquer inconveniente, nem nas universidades, nem entre os especialistas em bioética. Com 
este artigo, pretendemos discutir algumas abordagens éticas dessas intervenções clínicas no crime. A criminologia tem vindo a 
questionar, após o seu período de investigação positivista, a abordagem psicobiológica do crime, devido à visão redutora desse 
fenómeno e das suas consequências nefastas. Assim, neste artigo, abordamos a experiência académica dentro da governança 
prisional e os fins da prisão. Concluímos que as pequenas desvantagens da investigação seriam positivas se pudessem, sob 
consentimento, minimizar os malefícios da própria prisão, o que significa que o tratamento penitenciário e a ciência deveriam 
andar ‘de mãos dadas’. A administração das prisões, para além do dever de proteger os indivíduos de estudos que acarretem 
problemas éticos, deve promover a reintegração. Concluímos, assim, que os direitos humanos estão acima da política e da 
ciência criminais, e a ética acima da bioética mais restrita.
Palavras-chave: investigação prisional, bioética, ética, governança prisional, estimulação transcraniana
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Introduction
The hypothesis of reducing aggressiveness 
through transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) has been tested in two Spanish prisons 
since 2016(1). The resulting paper was published 
in 2019(2).
Certain concerns arose at the time the research 
was published and encouraged the General Di-
rectorate of Prisons, or SGIP, using the Spanish 
initials(3:323), to stop the ongoing replication 
of the experiment. At that time, no ethics com-
mittee had discovered any problems, either in 
research universities(2:32) or among the inter-
viewed members of the Spanish Bioethics Com-
mittee(4). Eventually, following an ombudsman’s 
recommendations, the SGIP stopped the experi-
ment definitively and announced an order regar-
ding the matter, which we will discuss.
We believe it is convenient to engage in a philo-
sophical reflection on this case, as it has conflic-
ting ethical and bioethical aspects and conflicting 
academic and carceral aspects. Criminology, after 
its positivistic period, has been questioning these 
clinical interventions because of the reductionis-
tic view of criminal dynamics and their harmful 
consequences. When, despite all, biologists want 
to become involved in criminal phenomena, they 
often act “like a bull in a china shop”(5:133). 
Therefore, as sensitive psychobiological interven-
tions continue in prison, it is necessary to revisit 
those arguments.
What was the experiment for?
The experiment, which involved 1.5 mA electric 
shocks, was an external researchers’ initiative that 
received the initial acquiescence of the carceral 
system. The aim of the research was to test the 
hypothesis that applying a certain current on the 
surface of the brain may reduce aggressiveness(2).
The participants, all men, were classified into two 
groups. The men in the first group, “non-mur-
derers” (n=26), had been sentenced for “robbe-
ries with violence, “fights for drug trafficking” 
and “gender violence”. The men in the second 
group, murderers (n=15), had been sentenced 
for “robberies with extreme violence [resulting in 
murder]”, “fights for drug trafficking resulting in 
murder”, “gender murder” and “murder […] by 
offer o[f ] reward”.
We have some concerns about the methodolo-
gy and the sampling. A) It is presumed that the 
violence involved in a crime committed years ago 
continues in the inmate; in other words, the com-
mission of one violent crime means that the per-
son is permanently violent. B) The methodology 
makes a distinction between murderers and non-
murderers. However, this distinction is unreliable 
if the study is based on grades of aggressiveness. 
The difference between murder and attempted 
murder, for instance, is not an issue of different 
levels of aggressiveness during the crime but of 
the result for the victim. For instance, one can be 
poisoned to death or almost poisoned, with resul-
ting injuries. The energy expended by the offender 
is the same in both cases. C) The legal meaning 
of violence in the Spanish Penal Code includes 
“violence towards things”, such as climbing a wall 
or using a key that is “not allowed”; therefore, in 
some cases, the definition has nothing to do with 
“violent people”. Regarding “fights for drug tra-
fficking” (there is no legal definition of that cri-
me), the methodology does not take into conside-
ration the social and anthropological implications 
and tensions for individuals in illicit or subcultu-
ral environments. D) Gender violence is, literally, 
cultural violence. The methodology does not take 
into account the social, cultural, legal and politi-
cal content of the legal classification and aetiology 
of this crime, which may lead to the belief that 
the aggressiveness of the offender has nothing to 
do with the cultural environment. E) Regarding 
murder for reward, we have the following ques-
tion: is a level of aggressiveness necessary to per-
petrate these kinds of crimes? It is wrong to think 
that higher numbers of contract killings in certain 
countries may be because the people in these cou-
nties have different brains such that they become 
murderers more easily. Additionally, we have not 
found any consideration of psychopathy, which 
may modulate the grade of aggressiveness used in 
a certain crime, in the methodology.
In the next step, these two groups, murderers and 
non-murderers, were divided into a real current 
stimulation group (n=21) and a control sham cu-
rrent stimulation group (n=20). Before and after 
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the 3-day, 20 min-session current stimulation, 
questionnaires were circulated to identify self-
perceptions of anger, hostility, physical aggression 
and verbal aggression.
Additionally, we worry that the questionnaires 
did not distinguish between aggressiveness indu-
ced by coercive confinement and the alleged ag-
gressiveness employed during a crime committed 
years ago. Studies have shown certain “pains of 
imprisonment, […] harms inflicted by long term 
confinement, manifestations of prison distress, 
and so on”(6:664).
The conclusion of the experiment was that “three 
consecutive sessions of bilateral prefrontal cor-
tex tDCS reduced self-perceived aggressive-
ness”(2:38).
The questionnaires were not repeated over the 
years; therefore, we do not know how long the 
effect of the stimulation was. We do not even 
know if there was any follow-up with those in-
mates, either within the prison system or by ex-
ternal researchers. Individuals in both groups, 
including the control group under the sham cu-
rrent, reported tingling sensations during the ex-
periments(2:34), which may have led to the belief 
that the intervention was not very invasive. Ne-
vertheless, some authors have reported negative 
effects on the brain resulting from these practi-
ces(7).
The cancelation of the experiment
The experiment was initially approved by the 
SGIP —Ministry of Home Affairs—(2:32). The 
SGIP allowed a researcher to enter a prison to ex-
periment with inmates, but nobody from the pri-
son system was present or observed the process. 
No member of the prison system was a co-author 
of the research.
Public concern arose at the time the research was 
published. The experiment was initiated in 2016, 
with the acquiescence of the Subdirectorate of 
Treatment and Reintegration(4) and the Establis-
hment Directive Board but with opposition from 
the Subdirectorate of Prison Health (8, accor-
ding to testimonies). In any case, the experiment 
was conducted independently of penitentiary 
treatment policies. Here, we can discuss who has 
the power to control a penitentiary’s policy regar-
ding science and treatment (and what would be 
most efficient)—every prison/team in isolation or 
the entire prison/criminal system? We agree with 
some authors that rational, centralized and vali-
dated policies may be most effective(9-12).
The prison system of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs has executive powers; therefore, it can 
make decisions on its own. Nevertheless, with 
the experiment being provisionally suspended, it 
brought the case to the ombudsman, which is not 
an advisory body of the administration. The om-
budsman opened a case, record 1900448, regar-
ding the matter and described it as being “[i]nitia-
ted by the [SGIP], to receive information about 
an electrical stimulation experiment carried out 
with inmates of [two] establishments […]”(13:6, 
annex C). The ombudsman ultimately said that 
the administration should have considered “the 
special situation of vulnerability in which people 
deprived of liberty find themselves, and the risk 
(higher than the general population) of not giving 
truly free consent”(13:116, volume I). Additiona-
lly, these practices should have been controlled by 
the Subdirectorate of Prison Health.
Here, we ask the following question: is peniten-
tiary treatment the treatment of a disease? The cu-
rrent misunderstanding of penitentiary treatment 
as medical treatment is immense. For instance, the 
Netherlands was condemned by the European 
Court of Human Rights in 2016 because the sta-
te did not provide medical treatment, according 
to the court(14), to rehabilitate an individual 
in a manner that could make him more eligible 
for reintegration. Thus, the recent case law that 
obliges states to provide means of rehabilitation 
is somewhat limited, as it is not based on holistic 
approaches to crime(14).
On inmate autonomy
Some authors have argued that a person in prison 
custody lacks the autonomy of being free to make 
a decision(15). That is, no informed consent can 
be considered valid because the individual is in-
carcerated.
The idea that an inmate cannot freely consent 
82 
Prison research: a bioethics or an ethics issue? - Manuel Fanega
because of the inmate’s deprivation of freedom 
implies that a person deprived of the liberty of 
movement is not free to think, to act, to choose, 
to participate in a prison program, to decide to 
marry, or to participate in a questionnaire or in an 
interview for science, for instance. This may even 
lead us to think that no penitentiary treatment is 
freely consented to; therefore, the goal of a prison 
to rehabilitate could be immoral. One of the pi-
llars of the modern prison could fail.
In other words, believing that scientists with no 
affiliation with the prison could not obtain infor-
med consent may lead to the belief that no inter-
nal treatment can be performed by prison staff 
either, as inmates are deprived of their freedom in 
both cases. Therefore, the quality of the informed 
consent is not the problem here because informed 
consent will be, in any case, more or less biased 
under coercive confinement.
Inmates have the right to autonomously commu-
nicate with members of civil society, including 
researchers, because their penalty consists only of 
a restriction of some rights, not all. At this point, 
we think it is interesting to note that this carceral 
system restricted the right for inmates to speak 
with journalists until 2020. Surprisingly, whi-
le the experiment was being carried out in one 
of those prisons, an inmate-journalist interview 
was being denied in the same establishment. 
This ended up being considered a violation of 
the inmate’s (and people’s) fundamental right to 
the freedom of expression and of the freedom of 
the press, according to the Constitutional Court, 
which eventually ruled against the opinions of 
three entities: the prison, the Prison Oversight 
Court, and the Court of Appeal(16).
In summary, there are clinical scientific experi-
ments and social scientific experiments. Both 
occur in free societies, and it is certain that cap-
tive societies are open to them. The key is just 
that the external researchers did not consider the 
social, legal and political aspects of the criminal 
context. The intervention was not performed as 
penitentiary treatment approved by a treatment 
board but as research for science. It disregarded 
the inmate’s prisoner status. Science should not 
be independent from prisons: it must work with 
and within the prison system.
Weighing pain
The harms of incarceration have been extensi-
vely studied(17-25). Being imprisoned is a kind 
of pain. Being imprisoned a long time implies 
even more pain. At this point, we can consider 
the following questions. What would happen if a 
treatment efficiently designed and implemented 
by the state because of its duty to seek reintegra-
tion could decrease a prisoner’s risk of reoffending 
to zero? What if this low probability of reoffen-
ding could lead to the prisoner being allowed 
more freedoms or even to an early release?
Despite the “minimum period”(3:315), which 
limits reintegration regardless of the risk of reo-
ffending, an inmate may benefit from science by 
suffering less pain from imprisonment. Therefo-
re, we should not dismiss the idea of addressing 
pain. A current stimulation, a methadone dose, 
stressful restorative action, and so on may mini-
mize the pain from a longer incarceration.
Thus, is it right to investigate and try to find solu-
tions to incarceration? We think so, but it should 
be done under a democratic scheme designed un-
der a global approach to the problem of crime. 
Criminologists think of that constantly. Moreo-
ver, as we know that the phenomenon of crime 
is multifactorial and even chaotic(26), we should 
consider less harmful interventions first. Addi-
tionally, we should reconsider the prison system 
itself(27-30).
Choosing the study sample
Going into prisons as a first option to choose a 
study sample for a study on aggressiveness and 
applying current to the subjects prejudges that 
prisons are places with permanently violent in-
dividuals, that violence is constant, that violent 
crimes necessarily imply aggressiveness, and that 
crime is a disease. In short, the implication is that 
criminology would not have evolved since the 
late-19th century.
We question why the methodology of the re-
search dismissed the idea of finding released or 
free individuals to partake in the study. There is 
much aggressiveness in a boxing ring, a traffic 
jam, and both sides of the battlefield or a riot. 
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The study states that the experiment followed the 
Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical As-
sociation. However, as Fernández Caparrós(31) 
reminds us, art. 20 of the declaration states the 
following:
“Medical research with a vulnerable group is only 
justified if the research is responsive to the health 
needs or priorities of this group, and the research 
cannot be carried out in a non-vulnerable group. 
In addition, this group should stand to benefit 
from the knowledge, practices or interventions 
that result from the research”(32).
The experiment used men deprived of their free-
dom for science, not for their treatment. Additio-
nally, the research could have been performed on 
free ex-convicts, a non-vulnerable group(33,34), 
instead of prisoners. Therefore, the experiment 
ignored the Declaration of Helsinki.
Universities have ethics committees, but this 
prison system does not. Do prison systems need 
one? We believe that democracy, as a dimension 
of human rights, should prevail over small ethi-
cal committees and deontological discourses(35). 
Creating ethics committees in prisons may mean 
another barrier against human rights violations. 
Nonetheless, it would be newly biased if made up 
mainly of people who think that the treatment 
of crime is just a psychobiological intervention 
on the inmate. Prison psychologists’ “priorities 
and terms of reference are not always compati-
ble with more sociological, critical and theoreti-
cal research”(6:663). Although other academic 
disciplines would enrich the carceral system, no 
criminologist has been employed in this system 
since 1990(36). In contrast, the Catalan prison 
system has recently and slightly taken criminolo-
gists’ views into account(37).
After the experiment
Those inmates who were subjected to the stimu-
lation were not—explicitly—advised of the peni-
tentiary advantages of a reduction of their aggres-
siveness, if any. Here, Professor Iñigo de Miguel 
Beriain has smartly questioned the morale of 
depriving an inmate of obtaining benefits from 
research: “Is it ethical to deprive a prisoner of the 
right to benefit from an investigation by the fact 
of being a prisoner?”(4).
However, the point is that this experiment was 
not designed for the inmates. It was not designed 
under an individualized program of treatment 
for reintegration—called PIT, using its Spanish 
initials(3:316) —but for science, in general. Ac-
cording to prison law, a PIT is the mechanism 
through which the rehabilitation board of the 
prison should identify rehabilitation needs and 
create a plan to address them(3:316). However, 
this was not the case. Science, with such a lack 
of consideration of inmates’ anthropological role, 
cannot ethically benefit from such research.
However, are researchers obliged to know the 
purpose of prison? On the one hand, we can 
argue that the ultimate responsibility may lie in 
the prison system. Researchers only want to test 
science; they are not experts on the criminal jus-
tice system. However, prison systems are experts; 
therefore, states should supervise and control 
interventions with people under their guardian-
ship. On the other hand, we have to note the 
following statement in the Helsinki Declaration: 
“[p]hysicians must consider the ethical, legal and 
regulatory norms and standards for research in-
volving human subjects in their own countries as 
well as applicable international norms and stan-
dards”(32). Therefore, from this point of view, re-
searchers must have a good understanding of the 
sociolegal environment in which their studies are 
performed.
The SGIP eventually signed an order that 
year(38). “Order [Instrucción] 12-19” was signed 
by the Head of Prisons, who answers to the Mi-
nistry of Home Affairs. The order is not a regu-
lation approved by the Council of Ministers, as 
are the current Spanish 1996 Prison Rules [Re-
glamento Penitenciario]. However, we are concer-
ned about how orders or circulars that may affect 
fundamental rights can be announced by just one 
person and not subjected to a greater democratic 
process.
The order pretends to create a permission pro-
cedure for undertaking scientific research in pri-
sons. It states that “any scientific research held in 
the prison context” must have direct and measu-
rable beneficial advantages for both the inmates 
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and the prison system(38). First, the order does 
not distinguish between different kinds of ex-
periments, e.g., social or invasive, for science in 
general or for an inmate’s treatment, or for crimi-
nological treatment or just biological treatment. 
Second, it irrationally constrains the scope of 
research: any participation in science without 
“direct benefit to the inmate and the institution” 
would not be authorized.
In the rule, in cases where “active participation of 
inmates” are required, the researcher must explain 
if the research has been previously done with “free 
people” (What does active participation mean? 
Does it mean answering a questionnaire? Does 
it mean doing a role-play? Does it mean being 
a member of a focus group?). Here, the institu-
tion mistakenly imposes the obligation to do so 
in every active participation, not just in invasive 
experiments.
Furthermore, the order stresses that research 
with inmates will not have “any penitentiary 
advantage” for them(38:2). This consequently 
implies that an inmate, having finally had some 
treatment with a positive impact on desistance or 
reintegration, paradoxically cannot benefit from 
being more suitable for early release or prison lea-
ve. Here, we can see how distant this prison sys-
tem considers science to be from its own prison 
treatment. Under this order, beneficial outcomes 
for participating inmates are forbidden.
It is true that inmates may think that coopera-
ting with the prison system “might enhance their 
chances of winning favour with the staff, gover-
nor, or even the Sentencing Review or Parole 
Boards”(6:666). Cooperating in an action solely 
in hope of receiving potential benefits might spoil 
the experiment. However, in this case, to preclude 
this option by law, i.e., by a rule and not through 
scientific methods, implies an enormous curtail-
ment of the chances of intervention towards rein-
tegration that states are obliged to ease.
This prison system imposes, through this order, 
extraordinary informed consent requirements 
for inmates participating in external research. 
However, there are also internal actions. We can 
debate the quality of inmates’ informed consent 
for treatments or actions performed by their own 
institutions. We know that it is an inmate’s vo-
luntary action to undergo treatment designed 
by a prison(39,40). Nevertheless, the treatment 
designed by a prison does not itself provide an 
informed consent formula, and there should be 
informed consent(41:14-15). This may lead us 
to think that there is a relaxation of the consent 
requirement when an institution looks inwards. 
Thus, we see two ways to intervene: inwards and 
outwards. Science and innovation from universi-
ties seem to belong to the outside world, while 
conservatism and control seem to belong to the 
inner world.
Conclusion
Prison systems should protect their inmate po-
pulations from being used as unlimited banks of 
subjects for experiments. The external treatment 
of aggressiveness analysed in this article was not 
within a prison policy program or ethically exa-
mined by a committee of experts on penological 
or criminological matters. It was solely bioethica-
lly analysed and disregarded the context of impri-
sonment.
Consent is possible to give while behind bars, but 
it must have strong guarantees and not be biased. 
To deny the autonomy of incarcerated individuals 
is to deny the individuals themselves.
A certain pain could be permissible if it were un-
der a criminal-problem-treatment-program ai-
ming to reduce other pains of incarceration such 
that the inmate would be more suitable for an 
early release or for a less restrictive incarceration 
situation. Moreover, states have a duty to work 
towards reducing all kinds of harm towards vic-
tims as well. To do so, making use of science is 
not only a hobby but also an obligation. Ne-
vertheless, doing so wrongly, as occurred in the 
analysed case, results in harm to vulnerable inma-
tes when they are used as guinea pigs for science.
To ask for advice on a decision from a bioethics or 
medical committee is not enough. Human rights 
as a whole must prevail and democratic guaran-
tees must be provided. Under the extraordinary 
circumstances of incarceration, ethical, not sim-
ply bioethical, debates must be held. Human 
rights are more important than criminal policy 
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and science, and ethics are more important than 
narrower bioethics.
Democratic attributes should be built into gate-
keeping dynamics. The ultimate decision to allow 
scientific research in prisons should not be dis-
cretionary. At least, penological committees to 
evaluate applications for prison research are nee-
ded. Under the democratic component of human 
rights, the reasons and procedures of that com-
mittee must be open to public scrutiny.
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